The long road of statistical learning research: past, present and future by Armstrong, Blair C. et al.
1 
 
 
The Long Road of Statistical Learning Research: Past, Present, and Future 
 
 
  Blair C. Armstrong 1, 2, Ram Frost 3, 4, 2, and Morten H. Christiansen 5, 4, 6 
 
 
 
1. Department of Psychology and Centre for French & Linguistics, University of Toronto 
Scarborough, Toronto, Canada 
2. BCBL.  Basque Center on Cognition, Brain, and Language, San Sebastian, Spain 
3. Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel 
4. Haskins Laboratories, New Haven, Connecticut, USA 
5. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA 
6. Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark. 
 
  
2 
 
Almost all types of learning involve, to some degree, the ability to encode regularities across 
time and space. Although statistical learning (SL) research initially focused on offering a viable 
alternative to rule-based grammars and specialized mechanisms for word learning (e.g., [1,2]), the 
processing of regularities embedded in sensory input extends well beyond language. SL, therefore, was 
taken to offer a comprehensive theory of information processing, holding the promise of advancing 
knowledge across various domains of cognition including visual and auditory perception, multi-modal 
integration, motor learning, segmentation, categorization, and generalization, to name a few. 
On the theoretical level, SL has had substantial impact on the cognitive sciences, viewed as a 
powerful domain-general learning mechanism and often invoked to argue against nativist or domain-
specific accounts of language and cognition. However, a retrospective view of two decades of SL 
research reveals a substantial gulf between the wide-reaching promise of SL as a theoretical construct 
and the actual empirical work that would support it. Since the foundational work of Reber [1], and 
Saffran and colleagues [2], research on SL has primarily focused on providing a proof of concept of the 
human ability to perceive and learn the distributional properties of visual or auditory input. This has 
been achieved by monitoring participants’ performance in laboratory settings with a strikingly narrow 
set of tasks: In one paradigm, sequences of stimuli generated by some miniature artificial grammar are 
presented for familiarization, and then subsequent correct classification of novel grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences attests for learning (i.e., Artificial Grammar Learning-AGL). In another 
paradigm, regularities are embedded in a sensory input (typically visual or auditory), and learning of 
these regularities (i.e., co-occurrence of elements, their transitional probabilities, etc.) during a relatively 
brief familiarization phase, usually on the order of minutes, is assessed in a subsequent test phase. 
Extensive research using this approach has indeed provided us with detailed information regarding 
performance profiles in this particular set of artificial laboratory tasks. We know, for example, that 
infants are able to segment artificial speech on the basis of the distributional properties of the 
embedded elements [2], that newborns, like adults, display remarkable sensitivity to the co-occurrence 
of items in a continuous stream (e.g., [3]), that this sensitivity is displayed across sensory modalities, 
(visual: e.g.,[4–6]; auditory: e.g., [7]; tactile: e.g., [8]), for verbal as well as non-verbal stimuli (e.g., [9]), 
that sensitivity extends to both adjacent (e.g., [10]) and nonadjacent contingencies (e.g., [11,12]), and 
that learning does not require overt attention (e.g., [13]), nor explicit memory (e.g., [14]).   
Although these findings represent considerable progress within the field, much of SL research 
has focused on relatively restricted sets of issues, often related to the types of regularities extracted 
from the input, the possible cues that modulate extraction, the necessary conditions for determining 
above chance performance in terms of rate of presentation, complexity of embedded stimuli, their 
similarity to previously established representations, etc. At large, the “Zeitgeist” of this research 
implicitly regards SL as an independent computational mechanism, akin to a device, that is specialized 
for extracting the distributional properties of the sensory input, where research should focus on 
determining its operational scope. This has naturally led to investigating SL in isolation as a separate 
ability from other systems. A corollary of this approach is that advancing knowledge of SL would be 
achieved by mapping the set of constraints on its operation. 
3 
 
Is this all there is to SL? From a theoretical perspective, would the full description of constraints 
on SL reveal its exact role across the full breadth of cognitive systems? Should the field continue along 
the same trajectory of the previous two decades for the next two decades? 
We take it as self-evident that a full understanding of SL is not tantamount to detailing 
performance of children and adults in registering the structural similarity of grammatical sequences in 
an AGL paradigm, and/or extracting the transitional probabilities between syllables or meaningless 
shapes in a stream. A powerful theory of SL as a domain-general mechanism—or set of mechanisms—
requires a wider perspective. If SL is a cornerstone of cognition in general, then a comprehensive theory 
will have to integrate and constrain SL by what we know about key cognitive faculties, such as 
perception, attention, and memory, what we know about their development throughout the life span or 
through evolution, and what we know about their neurobiological and computational instantiation. 
The main goal of this special issue is therefore to place SL in its rightful role as fundamental part 
of learning and development across cognition. It aims to foster a transition from studying SL in isolation 
to studying it as an integral part of different cognitive systems. This would involve, for instance, tying 
early statistical sensitivities in infants to phonological structure, to broader theories of language 
emergence, constrained by what we know about memory, attention, and their developmental 
trajectories. From learning basic regularities in the visual modality, to theories of perception, visual 
cognition, scene segmentation, object recognition, and what we know about the neural systems that 
support these functions. From treating individual variation in statistical learning as noise, to emphasizing 
the functional significance of such variability, in relation to what we know about learning and 
communication abilities and disabilities. In sum, this special issue offers a way forward to understanding 
how SL subserves cognition. 
Through this approach, what has traditionally been termed “learning” may usefully be construed 
as SL operating at a large scale, in coordination with the core mechanisms of other cognitive systems 
and abilities. This approach has the promise to offer not only a better understanding of SL, but also a 
better understanding of the cognitive systems it operates within. This forward-looking foundational 
viewpoint, however, requires stressing a different set of theoretical questions for the SL research 
community, allocating a central role for an interdisciplinary program that leverages the unique insights 
from different disciplines and methodologies. Fortunately, the seeds of this new perspective has already 
been sown and the time is ripe to bring these into an integrated whole.  
The diverse papers of the present volume, in one way or another, exemplify this direction 
towards the new frontiers of SL research. Each one of them identifies fundamental questions along the 
lines outlined above, and offers a blueprint for addressing them. Together, the papers thus provide an 
exciting picture of what the future may hold for a more integrated and interdisciplinary approach to SL, 
viewed within its rightful place in cognition. 
The volume was put together to provide a broad glimpse of the new frontiers, building from a 
low-level neurobiological understanding of SL and its neurocomputational instantiation, to a scaffolded 
4 
 
consideration of how these mechanisms connect with higher-level key cognitive systems. This 
understanding is achieved by drawing upon insights from evolution, development, and computational 
constraints on processing. The volume thus begins with Hasson’s (this issue) critical review of the basic 
neural building blocks for detecting regularities or their absence. Hasson outlines areas of convergence 
and divergence between models of SL and models focused on the coding of uncertainty. He then derives 
desiderata for future neurobiological work in SL. This review sets the stage for understanding the 
possible neurobiological constraints for any theory of SL.  
Next, Schapiro and her colleagues (this issue) provide a higher-level perspective on the 
important role of the hippocampus in extracting regularities from different sensory input streams. 
Through a series of neurocomputational simulations, they reveal how the hippocampal system can 
resolve an apparent paradox created by the need to encode distinct memories for particular events, on 
the one hand, and rapidly extract regularities among events, on the other.  Drawing upon insights from 
computational modeling, their work clearly illustrates how a more integrated understanding of SL and 
complementary memory systems can better define the interplay between the hippocampus and the 
neocortex.   
 Gomez (this issue) addresses the critical gap between the rapid encoding of regularities in brief 
laboratory experiments, and what is required for the permanent retention of knowledge in the domain 
of language. This work is informed by developmental insights into the different memory systems that 
support initial encoding versus subsequent consolidation. Gomez, thus, specifically targets the problem 
of ecological validity in SL research. Whereas typical learning in the laboratory proceeds at an 
exceedingly rapid pace, language acquisition during infancy is known to be slow in relative terms. This 
discrepancy cannot be resolved without considering the constraints of the different memory systems 
implicated in learning, as well as their developmental trajectories. In focusing on these considerations, 
we gain a better understanding of what underlies the observed differences between adult and infant SL.  
 In a related vein, Arciuli (this issue), discusses SL in the context of age-related changes and 
neurodevelopmental accounts of typical and impaired communication abilities, such as autism spectrum 
disorder. This work touches on a fundamental question: is SL a unitary mechanism or a composite ability 
that relies upon the close coordination of a number of separate cognitive systems such as perception, 
attention, and memory? Arciuli provides substantial evidence for considering SL as a multi-faceted 
ability, where individual differences in SL performance should be understood in terms of variability in 
the efficacy and relative maturation of these respective systems. This approach of deriving meaning 
from individual variability, as opposed to considering it as noise, not only explicates contrasting findings 
in SL research, but also offers a theoretical perspective for tying SL to a range of disorders. 
 Generalizing this perspective, Siegelman and colleagues (this issue) offer a formal conceptual 
framework for defining SL as a componential ability. By considering a range of findings from group and 
individual level studies, they outline potential dimensions of SL, and point to the major methodological 
consequences that this has for tying individual differences in SL to specific cognitive functions. This 
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framework offers clear blueprints for structuring future research, requiring researchers to specify a 
priori how and why specific SL tasks would engage particular cognitive systems. As a corollary, they 
explicate how some learning measures are better suited for probing certain dimensions of SL.  
 Of key importance to understanding SL as embedded in our broader cognitive abilities is 
determining the nature of input available for such learning. Clerkin and colleagues (this issue) adopt an 
ecologically-motivated approach to the development of early word learning, asking what the visual 
environment looks like during the first year of an infant's life. Although the visual input is very cluttered 
with many objects in view, the frequency distribution of particular object categories follows a power-law 
distribution: a very small set of objects occur repeatedly. The authors note that this frequency pattern is 
quite different from the uniform distribution that is typically used in SL experiments (typically under the 
heading of “cross-situational learning”). Nonetheless, the right-skewed distribution of objects in the 
child’s visual field may be crucial for word learning, as suggested by the fact that the names for these 
visual object categories belong to the first words that are learned. This paper thus underscores the 
importance of incorporating ecological constraints into both experimental work and theoretical 
considerations about SL. 
Although often implicit in the discussion of SL results, it is clear that the outcome of SL is not 
simply a representation of the statistics of the input. Rather, the cognitive system uses sensitivity to 
distributional patterns to shape its expectations and behavioral responses in an adaptive way, 
constrained by pre-existing biases in that system. The study by Feher and colleagues (this issue) 
provides an innovative test of this perspective in the context of self-tutored bird song learning. They 
record the songs of juvenile zebra finches placed in isolation and play it back to them moments later. 
These birds normally learn from adult males that have established categories of song elements. 
However, the juvenile birds themselves start out with a broadly distributed signal. Yet, the self-tutored 
birds quickly developed categorical signals at the same rate as birds raised with an adult tutor. These 
results demonstrate that SL does not simply involve recording distributional patterns, but rather reflects 
an active process of learning, shaped by existing perceptual and cognitive biases.  
The empirical work of Shimizu and colleagues (this issue) extends SL research on several 
important fronts. First, it focuses on visuo-motor SL, thereby probing the link between perception and 
action. Second it shifts away from classical SL brain areas associated with SL, investigating the relatively 
understudied role of the cerebellum. Third, rather than using the typical design where neural activity is 
indirectly driven by the experimental manipulation of the input, Shimizu and colleagues manipulate 
neural activity itself via transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to probe for commensurate 
changes in performance. This work not only reveals the critical role of the cerebellum in learning and 
generalizing regularities in the motor domain, but also raises intriguing questions regarding its role in SL 
across a range of domains.  
By complementing neurocomputational simulations, computational modeling at the cognitive 
level can provide additional insights into the possible mechanisms underlying SL. Thiessen (this issue) 
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discusses recent modeling efforts situating SL within a basic memory framework. He proposes that SL 
may be accommodated by two distinct kinds of computational mechanisms: one that relies on chunk-
based memory processes to store exemplars, and another that captures central tendencies in 
distributional input by integrating over prior exemplars stored in memory. A key feature of this 
computational account is that statistics are stored in any form—the effects of exposure to statistical 
patterns are instead reflected implicitly in the system’s memory traces. The paper thus provides a 
parsimonious way in which to understand statistical learning in the context of exemplar memory. 
Mareschal and French (this issue) address a related question that is currently the subject of 
heated debate: Does the SL mechanism target the transitional probabilities between elements in the 
input signal, or is it simply designed to group together co-occurring elements into memory chunks? 
Using a variant of a connectionist autoencoder model, they show how gradual chunking of co-occurring 
elements within an input can potentially explain effects associated with backward and forward 
transitional probability learning, as well as preference for whole-words over part-words which occur 
with equal probability in the stream. They also show that such a model is developmentally plausible by 
predicting the established improvement of SL with age. This work demonstrates the critical role that 
explicit computational theories of SL can have in reconciling apparently discrepant findings and 
theoretical accounts, offering a more parsimonious explanation of a range of effects without sacrificing 
descriptive adequacy.   
 Using the domain of sentence processing as an anchor, Altmann (this issue), in a sense, turns SL 
on its head. After describing how repeated encounters with regularities in the input are the basis for 
generalization and abstraction in the form of semantic knowledge, he reverse engineers this process. In 
so doing, Altmann offers a possible account of how semantic types acquired through SL underpin the 
ability to process and generate novel episodic tokens. By pointing to the reciprocal relationship between 
comprehension and generation of sentence meaning, we gain novel insight regarding the tight and 
intertwined relationship between SL, semantic memory and the comprehension of novel episodes. 
 The volumes closes with an evolutionary perspective on the interaction between SL, language 
learning, and the evolution of linguistic variation. Smith and colleagues (this issue) put forward the 
hypothesis that the relatively low prevalence of unpredictable variation in natural languages could be 
attributed to children´s SL biases against such variations, along with processes related to language 
transmission over multiple generations. To substantiate this idea, they develop a Bayesian model of 
language learning and language transmission, and compare its performance against that of humans in 
an artificial language learning task. The data generated by this approach cast light on the rich and 
complex relationships between the constraints imposed by SL and the evolution of linguistic structure. 
The emergent perspective considers SL not simply in terms of individuals extracting the regularities of 
the environment.  Rather, there is a two way street between human created “environments” such as 
language and SL learning mechanisms.       
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Collectively the series of papers reveal that the tide is beginning to turn in the SL community, 
where the accumulated evidence regarding processing regularities in the environment is now taken to 
shape and constrain theories of cognitive systems. The outcome of SL is not simply a veridical internal 
representation of the regularities of the environment. Rather it is a product of the interaction between 
environmental statistics, the computational principles of the cognitive systems in which learning takes 
place, and pre-existing biases, either from prior exposure to other input patterns or architectural 
constraints. The discussions going forward will consequently inevitably shift from dialog within 
community to cross-disciplinary interactions between communities. This would gradually narrow the 
gulf between the original promise of SL as a theoretical construct, and its actual implementation and 
impact on theories of language, vision, audition, memory, social behavior, etc.  
Such a change of perspective, however, brings a new set of challenges and questions to center 
stage. For example, how does encoding uncertainty in low-level biology (Hasson, this issue) relate to 
uncertainty in high-level domains such as visual word recognition, or sentence comprehension? How 
would the hippocampal system capable of encoding both statistical regularities and distinct episodes 
(Schapiro et al., this issue) relate to the representation of semantic types and episodic tokens (Altmann 
this issue)? Would the basic computational mechanisms tested in small artificial language experiments 
(Thiessen this issue; Mareschal and French, this issue) scale up to dealing with the real-world input, 
such as natural language (Clerkin and colleagues, this issue)? This small sample of questions highlights 
the new frontiers of SL research for the road ahead. 
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